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ARTICLE
BLACK SWANS, OSTRICHES, AND
PONZI SCHEMES *
NANCY B. RAPOPORT**

What did he know, and when did he know it?
—Howard Baker (referring to Richard
Nixon during Watergate)1

A few months ago, two different federal district court judges in the
Southern District of New York went two different ways on the issue of
whether the Madoff investors ran the risk of having to disgorge both their
“on the book” profits—much of which would be fictional profits only—
and the principal that they invested with Madoff.2 In Picard v. Merkin
(In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC), the district court
ruled that the complaint filed by Madoff trustee Irving Picard, which
alleges fraudulent transfers based on both actual and constructive fraud,
could survive a motion to dismiss.3 Judge Wood held that, when it
comes to fraudulent transfers under both the Bankruptcy Code and New
York state law, it’s the intent of the debtor-transferor that matters, not the
*

© Nancy B. Rapoport 2012. All rights reserved.
Gordon Silver Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas. This Article was made possible in part by the research support of the Boyd School of
Law. Special thanks go to Jack Ayer, Jessica Gabel, Karen Gebbia, Jennifer Gross, Nettie Mann,
Morris Rapoport, Bill Rochelle, and Jeff Van Niel for their comments on earlier drafts.
1
See Howard Baker, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Howard_Baker (last visited
Dec. 18, 2011).
2
A third recent case, Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), also
weighed in on this issue, ultimately ruling that the trustee didn’t have standing to pursue all of the
claims. In the one paragraph of the opinion that I liked, the court referred to the Trustee as working
“relentlessly.” Id. at 88.
3
Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), No. 11 MC 0012(KMW),
2011 WL 3897970 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011).
**
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intent of the transferee.4 She also held that the section 546(e) safe harbor
defense5 wasn’t a “get out of court free” card (my words, not hers) at this
stage of the proceeding, either, because the bankruptcy court had not yet
determined whether the safe harbor applied.
Less than a month later, in Picard v. Katz,6 the district court
dismissed all of Picard’s claims except the actual fraud and equitable
subordination claims, in part by finding that Madoff’s firm “was a
registered securities brokerage firm, a fact that directly invokes certain
‘safe harbor’ provisions of the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”7 Judge Rakoff
decided as a matter of law that section 546(e) had kicked in, thereby
eliminating Picard’s preference and constructive fraud claims. He
further held that the investors’ principal was safe from recovery absent
any actual bad faith by an investor, but that the fictional profits might be
recovered:8
[W]hile as to payments received by the defendants from Madoff
Securities equal to a return of their principal[,] defendants can defeat
the Trustee’s claim of actual fraud simply by proving their good faith,
as to payments received by the defendants in excess of their
principal[,] defendants can defeat the Trustee’s claim of actual fraud
only by showing that they not only were proceeding in good faith but
also that they took for value.

4

Id. at *8-11. She pointed out, though, that under New York law, the issue of the
transferee’s intent gets more complicated. The transferee’s intent comes into play, but just as an
affirmative defense (or if the plaintiff is seeking attorney fees). Id. at *12-13. The tricky thing when
using state law to avoid a transfer under section 544 is that state laws (by their very nature) aren’t
uniform. For fraudulent transfers, those state laws may be based on the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act or the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, but they may not follow UFTA/UFCA
exactly.
5
Section 546(e) provides:
Notwithstanding sections . . . 547, 548 (a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this title, the trustee may not
avoid a transfer that is a margin payment . . . or settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for
the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial
institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency, or that is a transfer made by or
to (or for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker,
financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency, in connection with a
securities contract, . . . commodity contract, . . . or forward contract, that is made before the
commencement of the case, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title.
11 U.S.C.A. § 546(e) (Westlaw 2012).
6
Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
7
Id. at 451.
8
Id. at 454 (footnote omitted).
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The court then explained that mere inquiry notice that there might have
been fraud wouldn’t be sufficient,9 but willful blindness to the fraud
would “constitute a lack of good faith.”10 In essence, if reasonable
people confronted with the Madoff scheme might have been inclined to
say, “what the hey?,” that wouldn’t matter. Only the most deliberate
type of ignorance—the legal equivalent of plugging one’s ears while
humming tunes—would demonstrate a lack of good faith.11
So, depending on which court is correct, the Madoff investors either
have several hoops to go through to establish a defense or very few
hoops. The applicability of the safe harbor defense is either a question of
fact or a question of law. If Judge Wood is correct, and the safe harbor
defense is a question of fact, then investing in a deal that seemed too
good to be true carries significant risks. If Judge Rakoff is correct, and
the safe harbor defense kicks in when a business holds12 a broker’s
license to buy and sell stock,13 then investors aren’t obliged to check out
the bona fides of too-good-to-be-true deals unless those deals are so
obviously fraudulent that no one could ever mistake them for legitimate
deals. (Under Judge Rakoff’s theory, I envision the fraudulent deals as
carrying legends saying, “Warning! I am not a real deal. Invest at your
peril.”)
To me, the issue involves that very Howard Baker-ish inquiry of
what the investors knew and when they knew it. In order to resolve that
issue, we have to ask ourselves what clues there were to the Ponzi
scheme that Madoff ran. And to do that, we must examine what we
know—or think we know—about investing, period. More importantly,
we must examine when and how we should question our assumptions
about investing.
Before the discovery of Australia, people in the Old World were
convinced that all swans were white, an unassailable belief as it
seemed completely confirmed by empirical evidence. The sighting of
the first black swan might have been an interesting surprise for a few
ornithologists (and others extremely concerned with the coloring of
9

Id. at 455.
Id. at 454 (footnote omitted). I have to admit that I was a bit surprised by the court’s
rhetorical question: “But why would defendants willfully blind themselves to the fact that they had
invested in a fraudulent enterprise?” Id. There are a lot of reasons why the defendants might have
done just that, as this essay discusses.
11
The Madoff trustee has appealed Judge Rakoff’s ruling.
12
“. . . Madoff Securities was a registered securities brokerage firm, a fact that directly
invokes certain ‘safe harbor’ provisions of the Bankruptcy Code . . . .” Id. at 451.
13
The fact that Madoff may not have actually been buying securities didn’t seem to bother
the court.
10
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birds), but that is not where the significance of the story lies. It
illustrates a severe limitation to our learning from observations or
experience and the fragility of our knowledge. One single observation
can invalidate a general statement derived from millennia of
confirmatory sightings of millions of white swans. All you need is
one single (and, I am told, quite ugly) black bird.
—Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact
of the Highly Improbable14

On long drives, I like to listen to books on CD, and I’ve been
listening to Malcolm Gladwell’s book What the Dog Saw and Other
Adventures.15 In the chapter Blowing Up: How Nassim Taleb Turned the
Inevitability of Disaster Into An Investment Strategy,16 Gladwell
describes Nassim Taleb’s approach to investing. The gist of the chapter
is that Taleb believes that he can’t figure out the market (nor can anyone
else), and so, instead, he’s developed a system of managing risks without
buying into the fallacy that he can somehow beat the system through
sheer brainpower.
Empirica [Taleb’s company] follows a very particular
investment strategy. It trades options, which is to say that it deals not
in stocks and bonds but with bets on stocks and bonds . . . .
....
Taleb . . . has constructed a trading philosophy predicated
entirely on the existence of black swans, on the possibility of some
random, unexpected event sweeping the markets. He never sells
options, then. He only buys them . . . . [H]e buys options on both
sides, on the possibility of the market moving both up and down.17

Countless gurus (and Madoff was one of them, albeit a fake one)
contend that they can beat the system—that, based on their own analysis,
they can determine how to make scads of money due to their choice of
which stocks to buy, sell, or hold.18 The problem is that they confuse
correlation with causation. (Or, in Madoff’s case, the problem was that

14

NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE
xvii (2007) [hereinafter TALEB].
15
MALCOLM GLADWELL, WHAT THE DOG SAW: AND OTHER ADVENTURES (2009).
16
Id. at 51.
17
Id. at 58.
18
My husband swears by Jim Cramer’s approach: doing some serious homework before and
after investing in a company. (When we watch Cramer’s show, though, I don’t swear by him; I
swear at him. And what on earth does “booyah!” mean?)
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he was flat-out lying.) The gurus assume that their stock market profits
are caused by their understanding of how a particular company runs its
business. Balderdash. They buy and sell; some of their investments
work out and some don’t. The analysis may correlate with their profits,
but it doesn’t cause them.
Just because a person has managed to make some money on a
particular stock at a particular time doesn’t mean that he has figured out
a way to beat the stock market.19 What counts is his willingness to look
for counter-factual evidence as a way of cross-checking his
assumptions.20 He needs to look for “black swans.” “Black swans” are
events that involve three components: (1) they are wildly unusual events
(2) with big ramifications (3) that we rationalize as “normal” after the
fact.21 One such black swan is the investment that never, ever shows a
loss. That particular black swan is a signal to abandon ship (as Jim
Cramer puts it, “sell, sell, sell”) and run hard in the other direction.
That’s why I have less sympathy than might be seemly for the
people who invested with Bernie Madoff.22 I feel horrible that many of
them lost their life savings. I feel bad for them as fellow human beings.
But I wonder why so many smart people ignored the red flags that signal
a fraud. With many schemes to disguise the financial statements of
underperforming (or fictional) businesses, there were red flags, but
people choose not to see them. They miss the black swans. In fact, they
became ostriches by burying their heads in the sand.23
Irving Picard sees ostriches in the Madoff story, too:
19

For years, we were “Baby Berkshire” shareholders because we liked Warren Buffett’s
investment philosophy. We still like Mr. Buffett as a person, but we sold the stock when the returns
lagged the market for several quarters.
20
Of course, it makes sense to pay attention to things like how a company behaves,
especially after some big-name companies like Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom have imploded in very
public ways. For many of us, our confidence in companies’ financial statements were shaken when
we read news story after news story on the type of financial engineering that misled investors.
Paying attention to obvious clues is important—who wants to invest in a company that’s poorly run
or downright rotten?
21
TALEB, at xvii-xviii.
22
I’m not alone. Check out Jack Ayer’s analysis of whether the Madoff investors actually
did lose “everything.” See Bernie’s Investors: Did They Lose “Everything?”, UNDERBELLY BLOG
(Dec. 15, 2008, 1:06 PM), http://underbelly-buce.blogspot.com/2008/12/bernies-investors-did-theylose.html.
23
OK, ostriches don’t really bury their heads in the sand. See AMERICAN OSTRICH
ASSOCIATION, www.ostriches.org/factor.html#head (last visited Dec. 18, 2011). But from a
distance, apparently, it can look as if they do. For the best opinion using pictures of an ostrich and a
human, both burying their heads in the sand, see Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-1665,
2011
WL
5924441
(7th
Cir.
Nov.
23,
2011),
available
at
www.abajournal.com/files/DG0R2WE8.pdf. OK, it’s the only such opinion, but it’s a marvelous
opinion just the same.
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The Sterling Partners knew or should have known that Madoff’s
fund was too good to be true because it consistently yielded positive
gains coupled with ultra low volatility. Between 1998 and 2008—a
period during which the S&P 100 produced negative returns for nearly
60 months—Sterling’s KW BLMIS Accounts rarely reported negative
monthly rates of return. During that same ten-year period, of the 483
KW BLMIS Accounts administered by Sterling, none purportedly
experienced more than five down months, and many purportedly
never had a single down month.
....
The disconnect between Madoff’s returns and the equity market
was particularly obvious during periods of market dislocation, which
should have caused the Sterling Partners to question Madoff’s
prophetic market timing. Remarkably, Sterling’s BLMIS investments
were effectively immune from any number of market catastrophes,
enjoying steady rates of return at times when the rest of the market
24
was experiencing financial crises.

In the Sterling litigation, as in the Katz and Merkin litigation, Picard
seeks to recover certain transfers under sections 544(b), 547, 548, and
550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and under state law.25 His attempt to get
the Madoff investors to pay back into the estate any fictional profits that
they earned, with some clawback periods going as far back as six years,26
is the right approach.27 I’m not the only one saying that: the Second
Circuit did, too.28 As between those creditors who had the tools to figure

24

Complaint at 193-95, Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2010),
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/0204sterlingcompaintfinal.PDF [hereinafter
Sterling Complaint] (on file with the Golden Gate University Law Review).
25
Id. at 205-364.
26
The Sterling Complaint uses reachback periods of ninety days for some counts (the
preference counts), two years for others (the federal fraudulent transfer counts), and six years for still
others (the state law fraudulent transfer counts). See id. at iii-iv.
27
His theory is called the net-investment approach. Bob Van Voris & Linda Sandler, Madoff
Trustee Picard Wins Ruling on Calculating Losses, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 16, 2011, available at
www.businessweek.com/news/2011-08-16/madoff-trustee-picard-wins-ruling-on-calculatinglosses.html (“The federal appeals court in New York said today that trustee Irving Picard can
calculate losses by subtracting the amount withdrawn from an investor’s account from the total
placed with Madoff, the so-called net investment method.”).
28

In satisfying customer claims in this case, Mr. Picard, as the SIPA Trustee, determined that
the claimants are customers with claims for securities within the meaning of SIPA. The
Trustee further concluded that each customer’s “net equity” should be calculated by the “Net
Investment Method,” crediting the amount of cash deposited by the customer into his or her
BLMIS account, less any amounts withdrawn from it.
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out that something fishy was going on and any other types of creditors
without those tools (for example, any tort creditors), my vote goes to the
creditors who had zero chance to bail out in time. There are valid
reasons to penalize investors who chose to stick with investments that
were too good to be true.
I.

RED FLAGS AND BLACK SWANS—AND OSTRICHES
While bad business strategy and bad investment decisions can and do
contribute to a company’s fall, it is a company’s desperate attempt to
use accounting tricks to hide bad decisions that often seals its fate.
—Bala G. Dharan, Enron’s Accounting Issues:
What Can We Learn to
Prevent Future Enrons?29

Hearken back to the first wave of accounting scandals in this
century: the Enrons and WorldComs and their ilk. Although an investor
would have to have been paying close attention to the financial
statements that these companies produced,30 a savvy investor might have
seen some patterns. At some point after Rich Kinder left Enron, all sorts
of financial indicators started to go haywire. For example, there weren’t
any blips in Enron’s cash flow from earnings:
One of the most common measures of earnings quality used by
financial analysts, debt-rating agencies, and accounting academics is

In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Elizabeth Amon,
Madoff Trustee Sets $272 Million Payout, Sept. 15 Record Date, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2011, 3:36
AM), available at www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-12/jpmorgan-chase-bofa-kkr-madoff-dowford-in-court-news.html.
29
Bala G. Dharan, Enron’s Accounting Issues: What Can We Learn to Prevent Future
Enrons?, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 113, 115 (Nancy B. Rapoport
& Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
30

Enron’s loss of investor faith started with the company’s 2001 third quarter
earnings release on October 16, 2001. As earnings releases go, this one must rank as one of
the most misleading. The news release said, in an underlined and capitalized headline,
“Enron Reports Recurring Third Quarter Earnings of $0.43 per diluted shares.” The headline
went on to reaffirm “recurring earnings” for the following year, 2002, of $2.15 per share, a
projected increase of 19% from 2001. But an investor had to dig deep into the news release
to know that Enron actually lost $618 million that quarter, for a loss of ($0.84) per share. A
net loss of $618 million loss was converted to a “recurring net income” of $393 million by
conveniently labeling and excluding $1.01 billion of expenses and losses as “non-recurring.”
Id.
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the so-called accruals, which is the difference between net income and
cash flow from operations (“CFO”). Accruals are positive when net
income is greater than CFO. When this happens, it usually indicates
poor earnings quality issues. Interestingly, Enron was apparently very
aware of the importance of CFO for analysts and bond rating agencies.
In fact, Enron ensured by whatever means necessary that the annual
reported CFO always exceeded the net income . . . .31

To make matters worse, Enron omitted some important information that
should have put the stock analysts (and Enron shareholders) on high
alert.
Enron’s 2001 third quarter earnings press release, on October 16,
2001, contained another major shortcoming—lack of information
about its balance sheet and cash flows. While the company’s press
release provided information on net income, the company failed to
provide a balance sheet. This is inexplicable—we teach in Accounting
101 that the income statement and the balance sheet are interrelated
(“articulated”) statements. This essentially means that we cannot
really prepare one without preparing the other. Not surprisingly,
almost every major company’s earnings release contains the balance
sheet along with its income statement. Financially responsible
companies would also provide a cash flow statement. Analysts and
investors puzzled with Enron’s lack of balance sheet disclosure had to
wait until after the markets closed on October 16, 2001, when the
senior management disclosed—in response to a question during the
earnings conference call—that it had taken a $1.2 billion charge
against its shareholders’ equity (a balance sheet item), including what
was described as a $1 billion correction of an accounting error.32

One billion dollars is a heck of an “oops,” and investors and analysts
who read about this particular “oops” should have dug deeper into how
the “error” occurred.33 I know that accounting is an art, not a science,34
31

Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and
Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 97, 109 (Nancy
B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (emphasis added); see also id. at 110 (“As the data
illustrate for the year 2000, Enron reserved almost all of its financial management of cash flow data
to the fourth quarter. Similar troubling contrasts in the behavior of Enron’s cash flow from
operations for Quarters 1–3 and Quarter 4 existed for previous years as well, including 1998 and
1999.”).
32
Dharan, Enron’s Accounting Issues: What Can We Learn to Prevent Future Enrons?, in
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS at 116.
33
Jim Chanos dug deeper into Enron, and he didn’t like what he dug up.
Given that Enron’s net income margins had also declined from over 4% of revenue
to less than 1%, the negative free cash flows should have been a major red flag for any
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and high-magnitude errors do occur. But when they do, it’s important to
make sure that the errors are, well, really errors, rather than lies.
I don’t expect normal people35 to go around scrutinizing company
financial statements looking for accounting signals of possible
misrepresentation. And part of Enron’s collapse was due to the failure of
many analysts (and rating agencies)36 to question Enron and to publicize

analyst trying to value Enron’s equity. It certainly caught the attention of hedge fund
manager Jim Chanos of Kynikos. He was quoted as saying, “No one could explain how
Enron actually made money . . . . Not only was Enron surprisingly unprofitable, but its cash
flow from operations seemed to bear little resemblance to reported earnings.”
Dharan & Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and Key Financial Measures, in
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS at 111 (quoting Bethany McLean, Why
Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58) (footnotes omitted); see also Andrew Hill, Enron:
Virtual
Company,
Virtual
Profits,
FT.COM
(Feb.
3,
2002),
available
at
http://specials.ft.com/enron/FT3648VA9XC.html (“Enron bolstered profits by booking income
immediately on contracts that would take up to 10 years to complete. It shifted debts into
partnerships it created and in effect controlled, even though defined by auditors as off balance sheet.
It used such entities to manipulate its accounts at the end of each quarter and employed financial
derivatives and other complex transactions aggressively to the same end. It masked poorly
performing assets with rapid deal-making.”). In fact, at some point, we were probably all on notice
that financial statements might not be as accurate as they had seemed. See supra text accompanying
note 20.
34
See, e.g., Matthew J. Barrett, Enron and Andersen—What Went Wrong and Why Similar
Audit Failures Could Happen Again, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS at
158 (“Accounting remains an art, not a science, which requires enterprises, and their auditors, to
exercise professional judgment in preparing and auditing financial statements.”).
35
Not that accountants are abnormal. They’re not any more abnormal than lawyers—not
that that’s saying much.
36

Moreover, a thorough inquiry into these dealings also should include the major
financial market “gatekeepers” involved with Enron: accounting firms, banks, law firms, and
credit rating agencies. Employees of these firms are likely to have knowledge of these
transactions.
....
With respect to Enron, all of these gatekeepers have questions to answer about the
money they received, the quality of their work, and the extent of their conflicts of
interest. . . .
....
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the three major credit rating agencies—
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch/IBCA—received substantial, but as yet undisclosed,
fees from Enron. Yet just weeks prior to Enron’s bankruptcy filing—after most of the
negative news was out and Enron’s stock was trading at just $3 per share—all three agencies
still gave investment grade ratings to Enron’s debt. The credit rating agencies in particular
have benefitted greatly from a web of legal rules that essentially requires securities issuers to
obtain ratings from them (and them only), and at the same time protects those agencies from
outside competition and liability under the securities law. They are at least partially to blame
for the Enron mess.
Frank Partnoy, Enron and the Derivatives World, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS at 177-78.
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their misgivings. Most analysts didn’t do enough parsing of Enron’s
financial statements. But some did.37
The key for those of us with little to no accounting background isn’t
to learn accounting principles. It’s to read news stories and ask
questions. It’s to be skeptical when things look too good to be true.
When a magazine like Fortune runs stories like Is Enron Overpriced?,38
that information is available and accessible to all of us. Our choice to
ignore accessible information makes us ostriches.39 And voluntarily
becoming an ostrich—a know-nothing—must have consequences.
II.

“HAVES” AND “HAVE NOTS” IN TERMS OF SECOND CHANCES

In bankruptcy, we often have the “haves” (e.g., fully secured
creditors with collateral that goes up in value over time)40 and the “have
nots” (e.g., unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy in which the estate runs
out of money before paying anything to the unsecureds). Even among
unsecured creditors, we can also have “haves” and “have nots.” The
classic “haves” are those unsecured creditors with priority claims that
must be paid in full before claims lower down the pecking order get
anything.41
But there’s another way of thinking about this “haves” / “have nots”
distinction: on the one hand, there are those unsecured creditors who saw
the light at the end of the tunnel, realized that the light was actually an
oncoming train,42 and had a chance to get out of the way before the train
hit them; and, on the other hand, there are those who were flattened by
the train before they could even see it coming. Those Madoff investors
who saw their wildly implausible positive returns were among those who

37

Jim Chanos and Bethany McLean come to mind. And in the Madoff scandal, so does
Harry Markopolos, who tried to alert the SEC to Madoff’s shenanigans. See, e.g., Allan Chernoff,
Madoff Whistleblower Blasts SEC, CNN MONEY, Feb. 24, 2009, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/04/news/newsmakers/madoff_whistleblower/.
38
Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/13/news/companies/enronoriginal_fortune/index.htm.
39
My dad, who is a chemist, said that the most difficult part of any experiment is to analyze
the parts that go “right,” and to ask yourself if they went “right” because they were right, or because
of luck or another factor.
40
Unlike our home’s value. Now that was a black swan that swam over, bit us hard, hit us
with its wings, and then jumped up and down on our backs before it flew off, chuckling to itself.
41
For the distribution scheme in bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C.A. § 507 (Westlaw 2012).
42
“The light at the end of the tunnel is just the light of an oncoming train.” Robert Lowell
Quotes, GOODREADS, www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/36912.Robert_Lowell (last visited Dec.
18, 2011).
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“had” a chance to escape before the Ponzi scheme escalated.43 They just
didn’t take it.
Few real investments only appreciate in value.44 My husband and I
have a few. Our joint savings account, with its measly interest rate, is
one. Our CDs and T-bills are others. All of these types of investments,
though, are exceptionally low-risk, and their low returns reflect that low
risk.
But I can’t think of a single investment based on the stock market
that always makes a profit. And the45 reason that I can’t think of one is
that I know that, in every good investment, profits ebb and flow. I don’t
expect every quarterly return to show steady growth, especially not in the
double-digits. I know that an all-growth, all-the-time return isn’t even a
black swan. It’s a plaid one.46
So the very wealthy people47 who begged and pleaded with Bernie
Madoff to handle their investments, who gave him their money in
exchange for the faux double-digit returns on their investments, and who
bought into the idea that Madoff “knew” the market, should have known
that something was peculiar. Those very wealthy people had access to
all sorts of other advisors who could have questioned the Madoff
investment strategy. Those selfsame very wealthy people could have
used their leverage to ask Madoff for more information. They had a
chance to get out of the train tunnel. They didn’t.48

43

The trick, as my buddy Jessica Gabel has pointed out, is in figuring out where to draw the
line between the “had-a-chance-to-get-outs” and the “never-could-have-had-a-clue” folks. Those are
subjective decisions, and based on how things are going right now in the Southern District of New
York, those decisions may well depend on which judge draws the case.
44
Cf. supra notes 40 and 42.
45
Other reasons might include a lack of knowledge or a failure of imagination, but I’m not
going to explore either of those two in this Article.
46
I’m reasonably certain that no plaid swans exist, except perhaps in law school
hypotheticals.
47
During Madoff’s sentencing, there were several references to middle-class investors who
had been harmed by his actions. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Judge Explains 150-Year Sentence for
Madoff, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, available at www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/nyregion/judgedenny-chin-recounts-his-thoughts-in-bernard-madoff-sentencing.html?pagewanted=all; Diana B.
Henriques, Madoff is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009,
at
available
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html?scp=1&sq=madoff%20sentencing&st=cse;
Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Madoff Sentenced to 150 Years, WASH. POST, June 30, 2009,
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/29/AR2009062902015.html. I’m not as
sure that middle-class investors had easy access to the types of advisors who could have warned their
clients about Madoff’s red flags, but, based on seeing the type of research that my husband does
before investing, it’s possible that people other than the very wealthy could have figured out the
warning signs, too.
48
It breaks my heart that Elie Wiesel’s foundation was one of the investors.
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And because they didn’t get out of the train tunnel, their faux profits
shouldn’t be honored. Irving Picard is correct when he insists that faux
profits shouldn’t be part of the investors’ claims.49 He’s also correct—
and fair—when he suggests that, instead, the investors’ legitimate claims
are limited to only the dollar amounts that they paid into Madoff’s
fund.50 Any other approach would give the Madoff investors two
rewards: their faux profits, and a jump over those unsecured creditors
who had no way of discovering that something funny was going on.
What about those Madoff investors who invested near the
beginning, before the Ponzi scheme began? Should they get their profits
back on the theory that those profits actually were real? That’s a tough
call that, to me, hinges on whether any of their Madoff returns showed
some losses. Fraud that’s disguised, such as fraud that depicts realistic
profits and losses (even if those figures are lies), is very different from
fraud that’s out in the open. If those early investors made real money,
and the statements that they received from Madoff looked like real (read:
normal) investments, they should be able to keep those profits. The line
between investors who should keep their profits and investors who
should be subject to a clawback of their “profits”51 is necessarily fuzzy,
but it lies somewhere along this continuum:
Clawbacks should start somewhere
around here, depending on the
relevant reachback periods.

Madoff statements to
investors showed some
profits and some losses
(enough to look like real
returns).

Earlier in the Madoff scheme

49

Madoff statements to investors
showed consistent doubledigit returns, with no losses in
any reporting quarter (red
flags all over the place).

Later on in the Madoff scheme

See supra text accompanying note 28.

50

The trustee, Irving Picard, has argued that investor losses should be the amount deposited
into the Madoff firm less any withdrawals, rather than the amount shown on their account
statements.
The 2nd Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in New York agreed.
Andrew Longstreth, Madoff Trustee’s Loss Calculation Method Upheld, REUTERS, Aug. 16, 2011,
available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/08/16/madoff-2ndcircuit-idINN1E77F0MU20110816.
51
I’m putting the fake “profits” in quotes to distinguish them from the real profits.
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Limiting the reach of the clawbacks to some point at which the investors
should have known that they should have been asking Madoff a few
questions puts the dividing line between the “haves” / “have nots” near
the right place.52 There’s not going to be an exact “aha” moment but, at
some point, the investors really should have known. My conclusion puts
me squarely in the Merkin camp53 and not the Katz camp,54 mostly
because I don’t believe that the safe harbor of section 546(e) is a slamdunk—and it’s definitely not a question of law, to be decided before any
evidence gets introduced.55 Without a safe harbor defense, we’re back to
the “what did they know and when did they know it” inquiry notice
issue.
III. CAN WE TELL THE REAL LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL FROM
THE ONCOMING TRAIN?
Madoff sure seems to have known what he was doing. He
cultivated the right people (mostly rich ones), made them yearn for a
scarce resource (letting him invest their money), and played into the
natural human tendency to want to believe that they can beat the odds
(with fake, double-digit, positive returns on phantom money). He lived
the kind of lavish lifestyle that most of us will never know, but that most
of us wouldn’t mind having.56 Who wouldn’t want to have hung out
with him in his heyday?
And it wasn’t just Madoff. News of the Allan Stanford Ponzi
scheme was roughly contemporaneous with the Madoff scandal’s news,57
and there are allegations that Société Générale ignored some of
Stanford’s red flags.58 There are more schemes out there that we haven’t
yet discovered, and there will be others that will begin when the Madoff
52

The exact right place is defined by the relevant statutes of limitations. There will always
be some people who luck out by being on the good side of a statute of limitation.
53
See Picard v. Merkin (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), 11 MC 0012(KMW), 2011
WL 3897970 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2011).
54
See Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
55
See 35B C.J.S. Fed. Civ. P. § 1158 (“A plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment must be
denied if affirmative defenses raise matters, which, if proved, may possibly preclude a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff as a matter of law.”).
56
Except for the go-to-prison part, and the bankruptcy part, and the being-subject-to-lawsuits
part.
57
See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges R. Allen Stanford, Stanford
International Bank for Multi-Billion Dollar Investment Scheme (Feb. 17, 2009), available at
www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-26.htm.
58
See Michael Rothfeld, Bank Probe in Stanford Case: Prosecutors Are Investigating
Whether Societe Generale Ignored Suspicious Transactions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2011, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904491704576572940023060486.html.
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scandal dies down. There will be large-scale ones and small ones. And
we’ll probably keep on letting ourselves get duped.
Humans (even really, really smart ones) have an almost unlimited
capacity to fool ourselves, and as Nassim Taleb has pointed out, one of
the best ways to fool ourselves is to assume that what we know is all that
there is to know—that because all we’ve seen are white swans, no other
types of swans could possibly exist. Add to human nature a modern
lessening of our ability to think critically, and you get the recipe for the
next round of Ponzi ripoffs.
So, critical thinking is key. At a time when we’re questioning the
quality of our educational system, I hear a lot about how our students
can’t write well and how hard it is to encourage them to go into math and
science. That scares me. We need good writers, and good writing calls
for clear analytical thinking. We need mathematicians, because we need
people who understand how numbers relate to each other. And we need
scientists, because we need people who are naturally curious about how
things work and who want to find out what we don’t yet know. We need
people who want to ask “why.”
We even need lawyers, not just to chase after Ponzi artists, but
because good lawyers are always asking “what if” something might
happen. Good lawyers are trained to think about black swans. Having a
healthy dose of skepticism keeps us thinking about everything from
“what if one of the parties wants to breach a contract this way?” to “how
do we know that the other side really produced everything that we
requested?”
Yet there were lawyers and business people and writers who bought
into Madoff’s fraud.59 Natural curiosity, a facility with numbers, and
analytical ability only work when someone with those talents uses them.
Maybe the latest round of scandals will sharpen our focus, at least for a
while. The clawbacks from Ponzi investors might get our attention, at
least for a while. Ultimately, though, we have to keep reminding
ourselves that there are black swans in the world. We’ve already proven
that there are ostriches.

59

The list included a law dean, some universities, several prominent business people, and
Elie Wiesel’s foundation. See Henry Blodgett, Bernie Madoff’s Victims, BUS. INSIDER, Dec. 8,
2008, available at www.businessinsider.com/2008/12/bernie-madoff-hosed-client-list.
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